## WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1	1. A system for securely transmitting Real Time Protocol voice packets
2	during a communication session with a remote multimedia terminal adapter over an Internet
3	protocol network, the system comprising:
4	a local multimedia terminal adapter receiving the voice packets, the local
5	multimedia terminal adapter comprising,
6	a local key stream generator for generating a first key stream;
7	a packet encryptor that encrypts the voice packets using at least a
8	portion of the first key stream to form encrypted voice packets;
9	the remote multimedia terminal adapter receiving the encrypted voice
10	packets, the remote multimedia terminal adapters further comprising,
11	a remote key stream generator for generating the first key stream in
<b>1</b> 2	order to decrypt the encrypted voice packets; and
12 13	a packet decryptor decrypting the encrypted voice packets using the
14	first key stream, wherein both key stream generators are capable of generating a second key
<b>1</b> 5	stream to prevent reuse of any portion of the first key stream during the communication
16	session.
1 1 2 2 3	2. The system of claim 1 wherein the second key stream is generated
1 14 21 2	when the system wishes to switch from a first to a second coder/decoder for
	compression/decompression of the voice packets.
3	compression/decompression of the voice packets.
1	3. The system of claim 1 wherein the second key stream is generated
2	when a Message Authentication Code algorithm change occurs.
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1	4. The system of claim 1 further comprising a local gateway controller
2	for forwarding the encrypted packets through the Internet protocol network.
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2	5. The system of claim 1 further comprising a remote gateway controller
3	for receiving the encrypted packets from the Internet protocol network and for forwarding
4	encrypted voice packets to the remote multimedia terminal adapter.

and

	1	<ol> <li>A system for communicating Real Time Protocol voice packets</li> </ol>
	2	between a local and a remote location over an Internet protocol network, the system
	3	comprising:
	4	a stream cipher module for encrypting the voice packets; and
	5	a key stream generator for generating a first Real Time Protocol key stream,
	6	the stream cipher module employing the first key stream to encrypt the voice packets for
	7	forwarding to the remote location, the key stream generator producing a second Real Time
	8	Protocol key stream for encrypting the voice packets when the system wishes to switch from
	9	a first communication parameter to a second communication parameter, each of the first and
	10	second parameters being involved in the synchronization of the key stream.
	1	6. The system of claim 6 wherein the first communication parameter is a
	2	first coder/decoder that compresses/decompresses the voice packets, and the second
	3	communication parameter is a second coder/decoder that compresses/decompresses the voice
	4	packets.
	1	7. The system of claim 6 further comprising a synchronization source for
i om om	2	synchronizing and enabling decryption of the voice packets at the remote location.
	1	8. The system of claim 8 wherein the synchronization source is a time
94 4	2	stamp on a voice packet.
	1	9. The system of claim 9 further comprising a new time stamp sequence
	2	generated when the second Real Time Protocol key stream is generated.
	1	10. The system of claim 6 wherein the second key stream is generated by
	2	re-executing the following key derivation function:
	3	F(S, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>")</n>
	4	where N is a counter incremented whenever a new set of Real Time Protocol
	5	keys is re-derived for the same media stream session;
	6	F() is a one-way pseudo-random function used for the purpose of key
	7	derivation;
	8	S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
	9	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);

11	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
12	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
13	representing a counter.
1	11. The system of claim 6 wherein the second key stream is generated by
2	re-executing the following key derivation function:
3	F(S, SSRC, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>") where:</n>
4	S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
5	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
6	SSRC is the synchronization source session identifier;
7	N is the counter of the number of key changes for the same SSRC value; and
8	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
<b>5</b> 9	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
10 1 1 2 3 3	representing a counter.
<b>I</b> 1	12. A method for securely transmitting Real Time Protocol voice packets
<b>1</b> 2	from a local to a remote location via a communication network, the method comprising:
<b>II</b> 3	generating a first Real Time Protocol key stream for encrypting the voice
# 4	packets;
4 5 6	forwarding encrypted voice packets to the remote location;
6	generating a second Real Time Protocol key stream for encrypting the voice
14 14 7	packets in response to a request to change communication parameters for the same media
8	stream; and
9	forwarding voice packets encrypted with the second Real Time Protocol key
10	stream to the remote location.
1	13. The method of claim 13 further comprising reinitializing a time stamp
2	for synchronizing decryption of the voice packets.
1	14. The method of claim 13 wherein the step of generating a second Real
2	Time Protocol key stream is by re-executing the following key derivation function:
3	F(S, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>")</n>
4	where N is a counter incremented whenever a new set of Real Time Protocol
5	keys is re-derived for the same media stream session;

	9	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
	10	and
	11	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
	12	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
	13	representing a counter.
	1	15. The method of claim 13 wherein the step of generating a second Real
	2	Time Protocol key stream is by re-executing the following key derivation function:
	3	F(S, SSRC, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>") where:</n>
		S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
	5	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
71. 1 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.0 71.	6	SSRC is the synchronization source session identifier;
	7	N is the counter of the number of key changes; and
	8	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
The same of the sa	9	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
-	10	representing a counter.
	1	16. In a communication system having a gateway receiving
	2	communication sessions from two or more multimedia terminal adapters, a method for
	3	securely exchanging voice packets between the multimedia terminal adapters and the
	4	gateway, the method comprising:
	5	generating a first Real Time Protocol key stream for encrypting the voice
	6	packets;
	7	forwarding the voice packets encrypted with the first Real Time Protocol key
	8	stream to the gateway;
	9	generating a second Real Time Protocol key stream for encrypting the voice
	10	packets in response to a collision detection wherein the multimedia terminal adapters have

the same source identifier; and

stream to the remote location.

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F() is a one-way pseudo-random function used for the purpose of key

S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is

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derivation;;

forwarding voice packets encrypted with the second Real Time Protocol key

	1	17. The method of claim 17 wherein the step of generating a second Real
	2	Time Protocol key stream is by re-executing the following key derivation function:
	3	F(S, SSRC, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>") where:</n>
	4	S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
	5	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
	6	SSRC is the synchronization source session identifier;
	7	N is the counter of the number of key changes; and
	8	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
	9	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
1	0	representing a counter.
	1	18. A system for securely transmitting voice packets during a
2000 2000 2000	1 2	communication session from a local location to a remote location over a communication
	3	network, the system comprising:
Tool thin	<i>3</i>	a means for generating a first key stream at the local location;
	5	a means for encrypting the voice packets using at least a portion of the first
	6	key stream to form encrypted voice packets;
	7	a means for forwarding the encrypted voice packets from the local location to
	8	the remote location;
Control of the contro	9	a means for generating the first key stream at the remote location in order to
	0	decrypt the encrypted voice packets; and
]	11	a means for decrypting the encrypted voice packets using the first key stream,
1	12	wherein both means for generating are capable of generating a second key stream to prevent
	13	reuse of any portion of the first key stream during the communication.
	1	19. The system of claim 19 wherein the second key stream is generated
	2	when the system wishes to switch from a first to a second coder/decoder for
	3	compression/decompression of the voice packets.
	1	20. The system of claim 19 wherein the second key stream is generated by
	2	re-executing the following key derivation function:
	3	F(S, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>")</n>
	4	where N is a counter incremented whenever a new set of Real Time Protocol
	5	keys is re-derived for the same media stream session;

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6	F() is a one-way pseudo-random function used for the purpose of key
7	derivation;
8	S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
9	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
10	and
11	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
12	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
13	representing a counter.
1	21. The system of claim 19 wherein the second key stream is generated by
2	re-executing the following key derivation function:
3	F(S, SSRC, "End-End RTP Key Change <n>") where:</n>
4	S is a shared secret - a random value shared between the two endpoints and is
5	known only to those two endpoints and possibly a trusted server (e.g. gateway controller);
6	SSRC is the synchronization source session identifier;
7	N is the counter of the number of key changes; and
8	"End-End RTP Key Change <n>" is a label that is used as a parameter to the</n>
9	key derivation function F(), <n> stands for an ASCII representation of a decimal number,</n>
10	representing a counter.
1	22. The system of claim 19 further comprising a means for synchronizing
2	the voice packets.